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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TRIA. BY JURY-EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE DAMAGES.
-The plaintiff, in an action to recover for personal injuries, moved for a new
trial on the ground that the award of the jury, $500, was inadequate. The trial
court ruled that should the defendant consent to increasing the award to $1,500,
a new trial would be denied the plaintiff. The defendant consented to the in-
crease and judgment was entered for $1,500. Plaintiff appealed. The Circuit
Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court, held that the conditional order vio-
lated the Seventh Amendment in respect to the right of trial by jury. [70 F.
(2d) 558 (C.C.A. 1st, 1934)]. On review before the United States Supreme
Court, Held, judgment affirmed. Dinick v. Schiedt, 55 Sup. Ct. 296 (1935) (Jus-
tices Stone, Hughes, Brandeis, and Cardozo dissenting).
In actions at law in the federal courts any right to have facts determined by
a jury, as to the amount of damages recoverable, is based upon the Seventh
Amendment; but where such a right exists in a state court its foundation must
lie in a state constitutional provision. Pearsons v. Yezwdale, 95 U.S. 294, 24 L.ed.
436 (1877); Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 171
Wis. 586, 178 N.W. 9 (1920), rev'd on other grounds, 262 U.S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct.
636, 67 L.ed. 1112 (1923). In cases where the damages are unliquidated the jury
by virtue of these provisions has more or less discretion in arriving at the
proper figure. However, grossly inadequate or excessive damages may be indica-
tive of a biased and prejudiced jury and it becomes the duty of the court to say
whether the record presents such bias or prejudice, and to set aside such a ver-
dict and grant a new trial where it so finds. McNamara v. McAamara, 108 Wis.
613, 84 N.W. 901 (1901); cf. Tommisk v. Lanferman, 206 Wis. 94, 238 N.W.
857 (1931). But where the damages are deemed excessive or inadequate merely,
the court may (1) grant a new trial on all issues, Lehner v. Berlin Publishing
Co., 211 Wis. 119, 246 N.W. 579 (1933) (damages excessive); Emmons v. Shel-
don, 26 Wis. 648 (1870) (award inadequate), or (2) grant a re-trial on the is-
sues of damages only, Amore v. Di Resta, 125 Cal. App. 410, 13 P. (2d) 986
1932); (1934) 22 Cal. L. Rev. 579, or (3) permit a remission of the excess
where the court deems the award excessive, Blunt v. Little, Fed Cas. No. 1,578
(C.C. Mass. 1822); Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69,
9 Sup. Ct. 458, 32 L.ed. 854 (1889) ; Bushee v. Wright, 1 Pin. 104 (Wis. 1840) ;
Note (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 185. But when the court determines that a certain
portion of the award is excessive (or that something must be added because the
award is inadequate), and a new trial is denied one of the parties when the
other party consents to accept the modified verdict, some authorities insist that
this is an invasion by the court into the exclusive province of the jury. Tunnel
Mining & L. Co. v. Cooper, 50 Colo. 390, 115 Pac. 901 (1911); Notes (1912)
39 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1064; Watt v. Watt, [1905] A.C. 115. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 55
Sup. Ct. 296, 300 (1935) to the effect that if the question of remitting an exces-
sive award was presently before the court for the first time the court would
decide against the practice of scaling down the verdict without a new trial. The
court, however, conceded that the scheme had been observed in the federal courts
for so long that the Supreme Court would acknowledge it as accepted practice.
Following Blunt v. Little, supra, remission of excessive awards was permitted
in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L.ed. 755
(1886) ; Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, supra; Gila Valley, Ry.
Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 34 Sup. Ct. 229, 58 L.ed. 521 (1913). See Corcoran v.
Harran, 55 Wis. 120, 12 N.W. 469 (1882) (the early practice in Wisconsin);
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Heddles v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 74 Wis. 239, 42 N.W. 237 (1889) (remitting
the "unreasonable excess"). The Wisconsin court has conceded that this practice
might result in impairing the defendant's right to a trial by jury guaranteed
under the state constitution. Heinmlich v. Tabor, 123 Wis. 365, 102 N.W. 10
(1904). And the accepted practice in Wisconsin now seems to be for the court
to set the upper and lower limits within which the court would permit a jury to
fix the amount, and to give the plaintiff the option to accept the lowest figure and
to deny the defendant a new trial, [Stangarone v. Jacobs, 188 Wis. 20, 205 N.W.
318 (1925); Foreman v. Milw. Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 214 Wis. 259, 252 N.W.
588 (1934)], and at the same time to give the defendant the option, in lieu of
a new trial, of consenting to an entry of a judgment against him in an amount
equal to the highest figure as set by the court. Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 270,
248 N.W. 127 (1933) ; Guth v. Fischer, 213 Wis. 323, 251 N.W. 223 (1933) ; see,
Ruepping v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 123 Wis. 319, 326, 101 N.W. 710 (1904).
The verdict may be further modified by the appellate court but that court must
always give the party so prejudiced the option of a re-trial. Campbell v. Sutliff,
193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927); Borowicz v. Hamann, 193 Wis. 324, 214 N.W.
374 (1927). The practice in Wisconsin may result in a denial of a retrial as to
damages. However the court, at the same time, is careful to have placed the
party affected in the most favorable position in which a jury on re-trial would
be permitted to have placed him. In cases where the damages are unliquidated,
as in the principal case, an assessment (or guess) by the jury between limits
determined by the court, (see Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann,
(supra), is the essence of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant case the rec-
ord does not disclose the extent of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff; there
is nothing in the record to show that the abridged award represented the great-
est sum a jury in its discretion might be permitted to award and in fact consti-
tuted an invasion by the trial court into the province of the jury.
ROBERT P. HARLAND.
CARRIERS-VALIDITY OF LIMITATION CLAUSE.-Three shipments of cherries,
in all 4,266 barrels, were loaded in Italian ports and shipped with the defendant
carrier, consigned to the plaintiff in New York. Due to improper stowage, the
cargo arrived in bad condition. One hundred and sixty-two barrels were a total
loss and there was damage to the others amounting to an entire loss of 581 bar-
rels. The remaining portion of the cargo was sold for a price exceeding the
value stated in the invoice plus the freight. This claim is made for the damaged
portion of the cargo. The defendant carrier resists liability for damage to this
portion because of a stipulation in the bill of lading which provided "that if,
after deduction of all loss and damage, the remaining cargo, in its then condi-
tion, is worth more at destination than the entire cargo was worth at the time and
place of shipment, the carrier should be exonerated from liability for the dam-
aged portion." Held, the valuation clause here employed is unreasonable and
contrary to public policy even if supported by a valid consideration. The Ansaldo
San Giorgio I, 55 Sup. Ct. 483 (1935).
At the common law carriers were held to the strictest degree of liability,
being responsible for loss and damage of goods carried except in the case of
destruction by Acts of God or the public enemy. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.
908, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1702). The late Justice Holmes disputes the assumption
that this rule was settled prior to Lord Holt's decision. See Holmes, THE COM-
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